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Microfinance Accountability in Cameroon; A cure 
or a Curse for poverty alleviation? 
 
Introduction  
In this paper, we augment the debate about accountability within 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) by arguing that managers and accountants of MFIs should 
work in consultation with all stakeholders and seek their involvement in any decision 
making processes that will impact on their lives and roles.  We take this position especially 
as accountability is an elusive concept packed with abstract meaning and therefore resulting 
to different meanings and definitions (Sinclair, 1995, Demirag et al., 2004). In our case, we 
look at the definition and meaning of accountability from the communal (Demirag et al., 
2004) perspective since MFIs main role in the fight against global poverty is to raise 
incomes of the poor and broaden financial markets for the poor through provision of credit 
to small scale entrepreneurs who have been deprived of credit in major financial or capital 
markets (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2000). In this paper, we adopt the definition 
of accountability as put forth by Demirag et al., (2004: 64), as “the management of 
expectations of various stakeholders, often with diverse and conflicting objectives”. So as 
to broaden this debate on MFIs accountability, through this paper, we identify the different 
forms of accountability practices existing in Cameroon MFIs, explore how such practices 
have evolved and become institutionalised through time and show the effects of these 
accountability practices on poverty alleviation. 
Unfortunately, due to pressure from donors, a majority of MFIs are unable to 
get other stakeholders involved in the decision making processes. Pressures from donors 
have pushed these MFIs to employ unorthodox accountability practices to meet up their 
objectives and costs (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, (2000) and Dixon et al, (2006). 
Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006b) argue that, as a result of donor pressure on MFIs, two 
types of unorthodox accountability practices, Functional and Social accountabilities, have 
emerged as a principal way for MFIs to curtail such pressures.  
Inspired by these findings, this study is based on empirical studies to 
understand the impact of using different MFI accountability practices in African context, 
with the particular emphasis on Cameroon. Cameroon as a case study is peculiar in the 
sense that the rate of poverty in Cameroon is alarming, with more than 40% (some 
institutions put the figure at more than 50%) of the population below the poverty line. 
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Moreover, the Cameroon is ranked by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) as 131 out of 177 countries in its index ranking for the poorest countries (UNDP, 
2011). The paradox with these poverty figures is that there are more than 120 non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and 800 MFIs/credit unions handling over FCFA 200 
billion (USD 395.4 million)
1
. At the same time, these MFIs constitute the largest in the 
Central African sub region (CEMAC (Centre Monitaire d’Afrique Centrale))2 with deposits 
well above 68% of the regions total and loan portfolio of more than 78% of the regions 
gross total (Elle, 2012). Membership (directly and indirectly) of these MFIs counts almost 
half of the country’s population.  
 This study is based on the in-depth interviews conducted in Cameroon 
in two phases: first, between the period May to June of 2011 and second., between July to 
August 2012 with managers and accountants of MFIs of the two largest MFI networks in 
Cameroon (CamCCUL and MC
2
 Networks), regulatory authorities in the Ministry of 
Finance, Professional Consultants and MFI clients and non clients. The study adopts the 
new institutional theory of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) as its theoretical framework to 
analyse how these accountability practices evolved and are institutionalised within the MFI 
sector in Cameroon. 
This paper is structured as follows; next two sections look at the micro-
finance, accounting and accountability research in emerging economies and state of the 
microfinance industry as it is today around the world and Cameroon, in the fourth section 
we present our methodology for this research and theoretical framework to show how these 
accountability mechanisms are institutionalised in Cameroon MFIs and discuss the findings 
of these institutionalised accountability mechanisms practiced by MFIs in Cameroon; and 
in the fifth section, we draw our conclusions as to whether these institutionalised 
accountability mechanisms practiced by MFIs in Cameroon are a cure or a curse for 




                                                   
1 The Exchange rate FCFA to USD as of the day of this paper stands at 1USD equals 505.8 FCFA 
2
 CEMAC countries are: Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the 
Republic of Congo 
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The state of the microfinance industry 
According to the State of the Microcredit Summit Campaign 2011 Report, 
641.1 million of the world’s poorest people now have access to financial services through 
MFIs, banks, NGOs, and other nonbank financial institutions. Out of the 641.1 million 
world’s poorest people that received loans from over 3,589 microcredit institutions between 
1997 and 2009, 128.2 million were the poorest of the poor who received their first ever loan 
(Daley-Harris, 2011). This has resulted in a drop in the number of people living in extreme 
poverty (less than $1.25 per day) from 137 million in 2011 to 124 million in 2013 (MSC, 
2013).  
Unfortunately, microfinance is evolving during an era of trade liberalisation, 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) and the reinforced belief in the virtues of the 
markets. This was preceded by years of heavily subsidised industries and generally 
ineffective government and donor financed credits programmes that have failed to benefit 
the poor to any significant extent and therefore destroying  many of the financial 
institutions that are suppose to carter for their needs and their natural credit culture (Harper, 
2003). This has made microfinance unable to sufficiently penetrate the poorer strata of the 
poor while excluding some of the poor (Morduch and Haley, 2001). Those excluded from 
the benefits of microfinance are the poor with little or no entrepreneurial skills, the mentally 
ill and sick group, the destitute and those below the poverty line.  
In order to stabilise these imbalances that have destroyed  many of the MFIs 
and the natural credit culture of the poor and left these poor without any significant 
benefits, Harper (2003) states that, microfinance advocates have put forward a win-win 
proposition that leading MFIs with good banking policies at the end of the day will 
obviously be those considered to have  alleviated the most poverty (Morduch, 2000). 
Unfortunately, this proposition has instead divided the microfinance industry into two 
camps (the welfarist and the institutionist) as to find who can provide the widest platform 
for financial access to help in poverty alleviation (Woller et al., 1999). This has led to a 
situation that Morduch (2000) refers to it as a “schism” and has created a rift between the 
two camps thus making communication difficult. Even if this debate was to be resolved, it 
has had excruciating implications on the future of microfinance, its guiding principles, its 





Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Accountability research in emerging economies 
In our contemporary societies, the meaning of accountability is an issue of 
intense debate and has led to a situation whereby the definition has become a subject of 
different interpretations in organisations and different people. This has led to the term 
accountability having different meanings in different political, social, cultural and linguistic 
settings (Lister, 2003). People working in the sphere of organisational transparency, 
responsiveness, ethics, legitimacy and regulation, in governments, corporations, or NGOs 
have often associated different meanings to the word. The reason being, accountability 
comprises aspects of that willingness to account for ones actions within the society and the 
obligation to be held accountable for those actions (Lister, 2003).  
However, western nations and donor organisations have realised that for long, 
they condoned with the malpractices in terms of accountability practices within most 
emerging economies. This is contributing in pushing their citizens further down the poverty 
line (Yunus, 2003). This has resulted in donor organisations using NGOs to fund MFIs 
involved with development and poverty alleviation (Unerman and O'Dwyer, 2006a) while 
trying to institute the notion of accountability. Unfortunately, what these donor 
organisations do not realise is that there are less stringent accountability practices between 
the NGOs and the other stakeholders (Dixon et al., 2006). With less stringent accountability 
requirements for NGOs operating in these emerging economies, the powerful NGOs use 
their political/economic powers to avoid accountability requirements. To Unerman and 
O’Dwyer (2006a), the accountability relations within NGOs and its stakeholders is often 
limited to upward accountability mechanisms to funders by the beneficiaries rather than 
being communal in nature (Demirag et al., 2004). 
  Our argument is that donor organisations and agencies have influenced 
accountability practices within the microfinance sector and emerging economies either 
positively or negatively. According to Riddell (1992: 53), the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in an attempt to adjust the malfunctioning economies of 
emerging economies through “currency devaluation, the removal/reduction of the state 
from the workings of the economy, the elimination of subsidies in an attempt to reduce 
expenditures, and trade liberalisation” instituted SAP that has had an impact on both the 
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economies and geo-politics of these states by increasing the divide between the urban and 
the peasant populations and increased levels of unemployment. To Edwards and Hulme 
(1996), the decision by most multilateral and bilateral agencies in a bit to promote the New 
Policy Agenda through NGOs with the aim of promoting good governance and ensure 
accountability has often led to distorted accountability and weakened systems of 
legitimacy. This has led to NGOs and donors focusing “on short-term ‘‘functional’’ 
accountability responses at the expense of longer-term ‘‘strategic’’ processes necessary for 
lasting social and political change” (Ebrahim, 2003: 813).  
 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework for this paper is the new institutional theory by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983). Our choice of institutional theory as our theoretical 
framework for this study is based on the fact that, institutional theory as a theoretical 
framework for organisational analysis of a case study places more emphasis on adaptive 
change and provides “a means of instilling value, supplying intrinsic worth to a structure or 
process that, before institutionalisation, had only instrumental utility” (Scott, 1987: 496).  
Institutional theorists argue that, in organisations, things are done in a certain 
manner simply because it has become the only way to do them. This pattern of doing things 
has evolved over time and become legitimised within organisations and environments 
(Eisenhardt, 1988). To Scott (2001), institutionalisation does not only come through 
legitimisation, but through deinstitutionalisation of existing norms and practices in which 
institutions become weakened and disappear so as to accommodate new changes. The 
process of deinstitutionalisation occurs as a result of three major sources of institutional 
norms and practices; functional, political and social sources (Oliver, 1997). To DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983), isomorphism has become the norm of most organisations  especially as 
at the beginning, organisations seem variable and as time goes on, they tend to become 
homogenous in nature and strive at achieving homogeneity rather than efficiency. This has 
led to most organisations adopting reforms as a symbol of legitimatisation rather than for 
efficiency (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).  
In this study, our use of institutional theory is mostly concerned with 
understanding the institutional pressures and changes (isomorphisms) that MFIs in 
Cameroon have undergone in order to accommodate the changes in accounting and 
accountability practices. Our use of institutional theory in this case is to explain how 
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change can be diffused within an organisation and a sector (Bell et al., 2012). We are using 
the Microfinance sector in Cameroon to explain how conflicting institutional pressures 
resulting from differences of accountability practices can be resolved  and also expose the 
unintended consequences of both resistance and passive actions of local actors (Bell et al., 
2012). In order to help the reader understand how these three phases of isomorphism 
(coercive, mimetic and normative) occur within any organisation and how this might affect 
the accountability practices in place, Mizruchi and Fein (1999: 657), argue that there is no 
clear distinction empirically on how each of these three phases of isomorphism occurs but 
rather that “each involves a separate process, but two or more could operate simultaneously 
and their effects will not always be clearly identifiable”.  
Coercive isomorphism concerns the methods through which organisations are 
pressurised by external organisations on which they depend to conform to certain norms so 
as to meet certain cultural and organisational expectations (Rodrigues and Craig, 2007).  
Mimetic isomorphism refers to the manner in which organisation as a result of 
the pressures from external sponsors are made to resemble other institutions within the 
industry that have been seen as successful (Rodrigues and Craig, 2007). In the case of the 
microfinance industry, since the early days of Jonathan Swift, the industry has undergone a 
series of changes and seen the introduction of new services all with the aim of offering a 
wider platform to reach the poorest of the active poor (Daley-Harris, 2002). 
Normative isomorphism refers to when people working within the 
organisations with similar interest organise themselves into a professional base with the aim 
of “promoting their cognitive base, diffuse shared orientations and organisational practices, 
and legitimize their activities” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 152 - 153). Rodrigues and 
Craig (2007) argue that, within organisations, there are two methods through which people 
act in order to legitimise their activities; these are through networks through which these 
social actors created in their formal education or through an elaborate professional network 
that spans across the organisation and thus facilitate these social actors to rapidly diffuse 
their actions and practices across the entire organisation. Through such professional 
networks, these actors are able to exert their control of the organisation by controlling the 
registration and certification procedure within the organisation and promulgate normative 





Research Method  
The main research method for this study is case study based on 35 in-depth 
interviews (10 MFI managers and accountants, 10 MFI clients and 10 MFI non clients, 3 
government officials and 2 accounting professional) conducted in Cameroon with managers 
and accountants of MFIs of the two biggest MFI networks in Cameroon (CamCCUL 
(Cameroon Cooperative Credit Union League) and MC
2
 (Mutuelle du Croissance 
Communautaire)), regulatory authorities in the Ministry of Finance, Professional 
Consultants and MFI clients and non clients. In addition, secondary data was gathered from 
official documents published by government, MFI and professional accounting bodies. 35 
respondents were chosen from 70 who agreed to participate in the research. The 35 
respondents selected were based on the criteria that they must have been working within the 
MFIs for at least 5 years. The same questions were asked to all respondents. The 
interviewer role was controlling the discussions while allowing the respondents to answer 
the questions as much as possible. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes to 2 hours. 
The topics discussed during the interview process are included in the field work and 
research design of the study presented in Table 1.  Data was analysed using content 
analysis. Through content analysis, we placed quotes from interviews under themes of our 
theoretical framework. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Microfinance context in Cameroon: the MFI industry, regulations and 
harmonised accounting system 
Microfinance or the credit union or microfinance idea started in Cameroon in 
September 1963 when Rev. Father Anthony Jansen, a Roman Catholic priest from Holland 
introduced the idea in Njinikom, the North West Region (formerly known as North West 
Province) of Cameroon with the establishment of the St. Anthony Discussion Group.  This 
group was created because the Rev. Father discovered that there was some sort of thrift and 
loan society (“njangies”) existing within the group members, charging high interest rate, in 
addition to numerous financial problems experienced by the group members. He further 
realised that most of the farmers were selling their cash crops such as coffee, tea, palm oil 
and cocoa to money lenders before the harvesting season at very low prices. It is from there 
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that the Rev. Father formed the group and explained to them the need for a savings and 
solidarity group to help one another. As a result of his efforts, sixteen members of this 
discussion group started with some small contributions that amounted to FCFA 2,100 ($ 
4.2). From this humble idea, the concept of formation of credit unions spread to other parts 
of the North West, South West Regions and today, the entire Cameroon (Long, 2009). 
However, microfinance only gained prominence in Cameroon in the late 
1980s, following a banking crisis that saw major commercial banks become bankrupt. At 
the root of this crisis was multifaceted government intervention, inadequate management, 
and a virtual lack of enforcement of banking regulations (London, 1989). Before the crisis, 
commercial banks and specialised institutions financed mainly large public enterprises, 
cooperatives, and authorised exporters. The rural farmers benefited only from a trickle - 
down effect therefore making lending a monopoly for the rich (Yunus, 2003). These 
unfavourable conditions obliged the poor to resort to decentralised financial institutions and 
informal financial markets, in this case Credit Unions, microcredit institutions, and MFIs. 
The microfinance industry has since been on the rise in Cameroon and 
CEMAC. Cameroon’s MFIs constitute the largest in the area with deposits of more than 
68% of the area total and loan portfolio of more than 78% of the area gross total (Elle, 
2012). However, as a result of errors from these MFIs, the late 1990s witnessed the biggest 
losses incurred by the MFIs in Cameroon. This led to MFIs experiencing high arrears in 
loan repayment and debts which amounted to about a quarter of the overall total loan 
portfolio and losses registered in the sector (Coulter and Abena, 2010, Elle, 2012). As a 
result, a series of legislations have been passed regulating the sector with the aim of putting 
in place a system of good governance and accountability aimed at protecting the deposits of 
the poor.  
 
Microfinance regulations in Cameroon 
Firstly, the OHADA (l’Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du 
Driots des Affaires) Legislation on cooperative societies operating in Africa came at the 
time when there were calls for harmonisation of business laws in Africa. The OHADA 
treaty on cooperative societies is a treaty intended to bind all member states who are 
signatory to the OHADA treaty of 1993 (OHADA, 2011). However, with Africa consisting 
of different sub regions, the monetary authority of each sub region is required to come up 
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with regulations for their various cooperatives and MFIs, but such laws have to be in line 
with the general principles of the OHADA law on cooperative societies (OHADA, 2011). 
This treaty is divided into four main parts (general guidance on formation of 
Cooperative Societies in Africa, guidance as to what should be done in case of dissolution 
of any cooperative society, penalties and sanctions, and other issues relating to the activities 
of Cooperative Societies in Africa), and into 390 Articles (OHADA, 2011). In the case of 
CEMAC sub region, the treaty came when there was already a regulation; COBAC 
(Commission Bancaire de l’Afrique Centrale) regulations on cooperative societies adopted 
and implemented in 2002 (COBAC, 2002).  
COBAC has as mission, the regulation of banking activities in CEMAC but 
was called in to regulate the Microfinance sector following the huge losses of the 1990s. As 
a result of the convention of 17 January 1992, COBAC instituted the regulation governing 
the exercise and control of MFI activities in the CEMAC sub region (COBAC, 2002). In 
doing so, COBAC modelled some of its articles on the French law on associations of 1930 
and the Cameroon law on associations of 1990 (Bocqueraz, 2001). 
COBAC regulations came at a time when most MFIs operating in the sub 
region had believed to have reached financial sustainability and were trying to operate as 
commercial banks or financial institutions (Tucker and Miles, 2004). This resulted in 
competition between MFIs thus affecting lenders and decreased accountability (McIntosh et 
al., 2005). As McIntosh et al (2005) argue, with the increase number of MFIs operating in 
the sub region, MFIs were competing among themselves and were unable to price the risk 
associated with the uncollateralised loans given these poor clients. Some of these poor took 
advantage of the situation and took out multiple loans from different MFIs and were unable 
to repay This resulted in high debts and the high delinquency of the 1990s (Dixon et al., 
2007). In order to recover these debts, MFIs were forced to employ various unorthodox 
methods (Dixon et al., 2007). So as to control the systematic abuse of lenders and protect 
the interest of the poor, COBAC regulations; firstly forbid MFIs using the appellation of 
“bank” or “Financial Institution” and require that their denominations be followed by the 
appellation “Microfinance Institutions” (COBAC, 2002, Article 6). Secondly, MFIs are 
grouped into three different categories (category one, category two, and category three), 
which each of these categories having a fixed minimum capital requirement and type of 
transaction they are required to offer their clients (COBAC, 2002, Articles 5, 7 & 9).  
Category one MFIs refer to MFIs that collect their member savings and use these savings to 
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grant loans exclusively to these members and there are no minimum capital requirements 
for this category. Category two MFIs refer to MFIs that carry out savings collection 
activities and can grant loans to both the said members and third parties. The minimum 
capital requirement for this category was fixed at FCFA50 million ($99,000). However, 
new government legislation in 2012 increased this minimum capital requirement to FCFA2 
billion ($4 million). Category three MFIs refer to those institutions that have the ability to 
grant loans to third parties without necessarily carrying out any prior saving collections. 
The minimum capital requirement for this category was fixed at FCFA25 million 
($49,500). Again, the new government legislation increased this minimum capital 
requirement to FCFA100 million ($198,000). 
Other important aspects of the COBAC regulations includes differentiating 
between MFIs that do operate as independent MFIs and those that decide to exercise their 
activities under an umbrella organisation, such as the CamCCUL and MC
2
 networks 
(COBAC, 2002, Article 12 & 13). If MFIs decide to operate under an umbrella 
organisation, articles 15  clearly spells out the prerogatives of the umbrella organisation and 
affiliates, such as how to protect the network financial liquidity, what happens to the 
financial stability of the network should one or more affiliates become bankrupt, conditions 
of internal control of the network, the definition of which accounting plan, norms and 
procedures to follow, how accounting documents can be consolidated following the stated 
procedures laid down by the banking commission. 
  The intention of these regulations is to provide a wider platform for these 
MFIs to reach the poor, especially the category one MFIs. Today, the category one MFIs 
control more than 80 percent of the microfinance market in Cameroon and handles more 
than 75 percent of deposits and savings from the poor (this information was gathered 
through document review during the fieldwork).  
 
Influence of external pressures to harmonise accounting practices in Cameroon 
The OHADA treaty of 1993, on which the 2011 OHADA law on Cooperative 
Societies has been developed is the result of the harmonisation for business laws that came 
at a back drop of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) agreement of 
June 2002 at the G8 Kananaskis summit. According to Enonchong (2007: 95) the principal 
objective of the OHADA treaty is “to harmonise and modernise business laws in Africa so 
as to facilitate commercial activity, attract foreign investment and secure economic 
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integration in Africa” as stipulated “within the objectives of the NEPAD agreement”. This 
in effect has resulted in the drafting of OHADA treaty that has been extended into the 
microfinance sector.  
These changes in accounting standards have an effect on accountability in 
Cameroon especially as the 2 Cameroons have different accounting histories.  The French 
and British Cameroon both have different political and accounting histories. Prior to the 
period up to unification in 1961, the British Cameroonians were used to Chapter 37 of the 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958, which was modelled on the British 
Companies Ordinance of 1922, while the French Cameroon were using Ordonnance de 
Commerce of 1673 which was put through by Jean-Baptiste Colbert during the reign of 
Louis XIV, and the Napoleonic Commercial Code of 1807, that influenced the bookkeeping 
provisions of commercial law throughout Continental Europe (except the United 
Kingdom), Francophone Africa, and beyond (Elad and Tumnde, 2007). Chapter 37 of the 
Laws of the Federation of Nigeria and Lagos, 1958, had no provision or requirement for 
organisations operating in British Cameroon to keep any records of accounting and 
bookkeeping (Elad and Tumnde, 2007). After unification on February 1961, even with both 
French and British Cameroon as one nation, these accounting systems were still 
maintained, even though with slight modifications for French Cameroon with the 
introduction of the Plan Comptable General (PCG) (Barrett and Roy, 1976).  
Because of pressure from international donors, in order to qualify for aid, 
African countries hastily drafted and adopted OHADA treaty in 1993 (London, 1989, Elad 
and Tumnde, 2007, Enonchong, 2007). Basically, OHADA treaty is a blend of the Anglo-
Saxon model of Accounting with the French accounting system approach by codifying 
some of the provisions of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and 
incorporating them as articles within the framework of OHADA in line with the French 
civil law tradition “wherein codes and statutes are highly structured and systematized” 
(Elad and Tumnde, 2007: 1). The OHADA treaty is currently ratified by 17 African 
countries: 14 of which are Francophone African states, one Spanish-speaking country 
(Equatorial Guinea), one Portuguese-speaking country (Guinea Bissau), and one bilingual 
country (Cameroon) that has both French and English as official languages. 
Unfortunately, the OHADA treaty replaces the OCAM (Organisation 
Commune Africaine et Malgache) accounting plan which was introduced in Cameroon in 
1963. The OCAM Plan according to Elad (1992: 87) “was very much in tune with the spirit 
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of the British Corporate Report (ASC, 1975), the Canadian Stamp Report (CICA, 1980) 
and the Trueblood Report (AICPA, 1973)”.  
 
Discussion and analysis  
 
Impact of accounting harmonisation and MFI regulations on microfinance practices in 
Cameroon 
The pressures to harmonise accounting practices in Cameroon had a direct 
impact on MFIs. As DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue, a powerful institution through 
coercive isomorphism forces organisations to change their practices so as to meet certain 
cultural and environmental expectations. In the case of MFIs operating in Cameroon, these 
pressures as a Director in the Ministry of Finance argue came in the form of; 
“NEPAD has four principal objectives; eradicating poverty, empowering 
women, promoting sustainable growth and development in Africa, and the 
integration of Africa into the World economy. Today, we are talking about 
microfinance and at the CEMAC level, we see that microfinance is the spine 
to achieve these four objectives as these institutions touches on every aspect 
of the NEPAD agreement”  
With MFIs pressurised to meet the demands of the regulators (Flack and Ryan, 2003), 
another Director in the Ministry of Finance argue that MFIs that comply are rewarded with 
“a common regulatory regime that is almost same as in their (funders) countries and for 
which they will be able to carry out any investments without fear.”.  
What we find here is a situation where MFIs have been forced to change their 
accounting standards with the aim of meeting external donor demands. This is what Di 
Maggio and Powell (1983) refer to as coercive isomorphism. These pressures as argued by 
another Director in the Ministry of Finance provides MFIs operating in Cameroon the 
platform to legitimise their activities with “a common financial reporting system, following 
the provisions of IFRS, a common system of presenting balance sheet information etc” that 
will help MFIs “adequately meet the needs of the poor and be more accountable to their 
members”. 
MFIs in Cameroon in order to achieve homogeneity (mimetic isomorphism) 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) a manager of an MFI argued;  
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“These changes in regulations governing the microfinance sector in Cameroon 
were necessary. This is because, in the past and as a result of the lack of strict 
control and supervision of the industry, we became very complacent and 
screening between good and bad customers was less stringent leading to the 
huge losses that many of the MFIs operating in Cameroon incurred in the late 
1990s”.  
To an accountant of an MFI, this homogeneity can be achieved through 
having in place “better explanations as to how to assess the risk involved with micro 
lending, single financial reporting standards across the entire microfinance sector”. He 
further argued that these regulations will further help MFIs gain legitimacy especially as 
“there were discrepancies leading to two different accounting plans being used across the 
MFI sector in Cameroon”. 
Unfortunately as Flack and Ryan (2003) argue, the consequences often 
associated with such pressures are increase professionalism and the development of large 
bureaucratic structures so as to counteract these pressures as we show in the following 
sections.   
 
The beginning of an impending crisis - dysfunctional accountability  
Understanding the accountability mechanism that existed within the MFI 
industry in Cameroon for us required tracing back to the system of accountability that was 
initially in place before the COBAC regulation. Prior to the COBAC regulations, there 
were discrepancies in accountability practices due to differences in accounting practices 
between MFIs in the French and English zones of Cameroon. In the French part, MFIs 
adopted OCAM
3
 whereas MFIs in the English zone were using British Accounting system.   
The reason why MFIs adopted different accounting practices as argued by an 
elderly MFI client, is because of “the colonial rule of the Germans, French and British 
administrators that required complete compliance from leaders in these different societies”. 
Following on from these historical roots, a manager argued that “the regulations have 
created bureaucratic structures that do not take into consideration the environments in 
which the MFIs operate”. He further argued that “the regulations have created conflict of 
interest between managers, clients and shareholders and disrupted governance within these 
                                                   
3 Discussion about OCAM Accounting is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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MFI”. As Bakker et al (2014) argue, these are the unintended consequences of 
homogeneity. As another MFI manager argued, “the regulations in place do not promote 
accountability but have left MFIs to focus on meeting the requirements of the regulations 
rather than being closer to the poor and offer advice as to which service best suit their 
needs”.  
Due to prior lack of accountability, strict regulations and control of the 
microfinance sector, leading MFIs incurred debts of more than a quarter of the overall 
losses incurred by MFIs in the CEMAC sub region. The reason for these debts is because 
annual reports of MFIs that should be used to demonstrate accountability, were used for 
legitimacy rather than efficiency (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, Flack and Ryan, 2003). In 
this case, we are left with a situation described by an MFI client as “a breakdown of a 
whole system caused by people becoming more selfish and less accountable to each other”.  
However, as Scott (2001) argue, for an organisation to gain legitimacy this 
has to come through deinstitutionalising existing norms and practices through which some 
institutions might become weakened and disappear. The process of deinstitutionalisation of 
existing practices within the microfinance sector in Cameroon have come through a 
functional process (Oliver, 1997). This functional process as a director in the Ministry of 
Finance told us involves categorising MFIs into “category one, two and three and setting 
their limits and boundaries of operations in terms of capital requirements and consolidation 
of their accounts”. The Director further argues that the functional process weakens some 
institutions through “capital requirements” and the social process involves “requirements 
for financial report, to ease control of MFIs, protecting the financial stability of the 
institution, the poor and shareholders” 
According to Bell et al (2012), such changes in both functional and social 
processes have resulted to decoupling from other organisational actors in order to shield 
their organisations from the influence of external intrusion (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 
2005). This resistance according to a consultant comes mostly from the managers who try 
to maintain the status quo by not operating within the strict limits of the category one 
institutions. The reason behind this according to the Consultant is because; 
“The microfinance sector in Cameroon has become a lucrative investment 
sector and no MFI is ready to strictly operate under the category for which 
they were registered. The worse is those affiliated to a network, for they have 
to pay huge sums to the umbrella organisation as consultation fees which 
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often leave these MFIs with little to carter for their business if they have to 
operate under the category for which they were registered” 
One of such reasons for resistance according to Yazdifar and Tsamenyi 
(2005) is not only because of organisational restructuring in order to accommodate the new 
changes, but because must changes do not take into consideration local factors such as local 
power, politics and culture.  The reason for such resistance according to this MFI Manager; 
“We have pressures from governments to strictly apply the OHADA 
accounting plan, our shareholders want a return on their investments, and 
COBAC officials want us to comply with their regulations. So what becomes 
of the MFI if we are to strictly operate as category one?” 
 
The involvement of external institutions in the regulation of the MFIs in 
Cameroon has resulted to a dysfunctional form of accountability. As Siti-Nabiha and 
Scapens (2005) and Yazdifar and Tsamenyi (2005) argue, without taking into account the 
power of those involved within the organisations, this has resulted into resistance that has 
destabilised the implementation of any changes in accounting rules and routines. The end 
result is that  the COBAC regulations have given powers to the “Reified Might” to use such 
power over the “Reified Right” ( in this case the poor) (Ebrahim, 2003). Managers now use 
such power to satisfy the needs of their employers rather than providing services that can 
benefit the poor. 
 
The reactions from MFI industry: Manipulative accountability?  
The reason why the industry has undergone such reforms according to 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) is to permit these institutions to either ceremonially or 
actually gain legitimacy through mimetic isomorphism. In order to permit the MFIs in 
Cameroon gain this legitimacy, the industry has undergone functional, political, and social 
changes (Oliver, 1997). However, what remains to be seen is how these changes have 
improved accountability and the fight against poverty.  
As part of the social process to either ceremonially or actually gain 
legitimacy, MFIs in Cameroon have organised themselves into two biggest microfinance 
consortia, the CamCCUL and MC
2
 networks. As Greenwood et al (2002) argue, these two 
networks have diffused their ideas through controlling the registration process. To become 
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a member, you need to buy shares within that MFI. These shares according to a consultant 
are; 
“A minimum share of FCFA 10,000, solidarity fund which is 10% of share 
capital, registration fees of FCFA 2,500, building fund of FCFA 25,000. But 
what these institutions do is they require customers to buy at least 3 shares 
that should amount to FCFA 30,000. So if we add up these sums, we see that 
in order to become a member of an MFI, you need at least FCFA 45,000 
(approximately $88.3), thus putting microfinance above the reach of the 
ordinary poor who by definition lives on less than $1 or $2 a day”  
By controlling this registration process, these institutions are able to exert 
their purposive actions that create, maintain, and potentially disrupt institutions (Yazdifar 
and Tsamenyi, 2005). This has led to MFIs in Cameroon practising different accountability 
methods. These two forms of accountability according to a consultant sees “MFIs affiliated 
to CamCCUL opening offices all the place whereas those affiliated to MC
2
 are not allowed 
to do so by their parent company”. This has led to a situation which a consultant argues,  
“The rural population have become the milking cows of these MFIs who open 
offices in the rural areas and collect savings from these rural populace and 
invest in big cities where they are sure to get wealthy individuals so as to 
make gains from these savings for their shareholders”. 
As Siti-Nabiha and Scapens (2005) and Yazdifar and Tsamenyi (2005) argue, 
the actions of these organisational participants have seen them destabilise not only the 
institutions, but create more wealth for their owners by segregating on the poor when it 
comes to loan sizes. An accountant within the CamCCUL Network admitted that “when we 
talk about loans granted to the rural poor, these loans are in volumes, but when we talk 
about loans granted in value, it is the business people who have an upper edge”. They also 
exert their purposive actions through instituting “collaterals” and third party guarantors for 
the poor to secure loans as attested by a manager. This has led to a situation where “during 
Board meetings, most shareholders are not interested in whatever story you tell them. All 
they want to hear is how much dividend they are getting by the end of that financial year”. 
To Bakker et al (2014), this is one of the actions of the passive actors leading to different 
stakeholders posing different challenges in behaviour, values and attitudes (Javidan and 
Dastmalchian, 1993). With these challenges in behaviour, values and attitudes, a manager 
working with CamCCUL network argued that this has not only disrupted the governance of 
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these MFIs” but left them no choice than “do whatever it takes to meet up with the 
demands of our shareholders” such as opening “offices in big cities” targeting “business 
people who are willing to take out huge loans”. 
While managers and accountants of the CamCCUL Network are faced with 
challenges, those of the MC
2
 Network do not. The reason as the Directors in Afriland First 
Bank that oversees the control of all MC
2
s in Cameroon argues is that; 
“An MC2 is that it is an institution opened to help people of the locality for 
which they are registered. Therefore by opening branches outside of their area 
of registration means they will obviously not be there to take care of the local 
indigenes that have savings within that MC
2”. 
  
This situation to us sounds logical, for the main reason for an MFI is to offer 
cheap loans to the poor at affordable interest rates. Thus opening branches in cities thus 
alienates the poor who are based in villages and who are the majority savers within that 
MFI from benefiting from the services the MFI has to offer them. And as another Director 
of Afriland First Bank told us, 
“The MC2 operates under the vision that, given the means and potential, the 
people can together take their destiny in their hands and do something with 
their poverty situation. Therefore, the MC
2
 is there to provide them that 
means and potentials for them (rural masses) to now take their destiny into 
their own hands and fight poverty”. 
In order to enable the MFIs in Cameroon mime successful institutions within 
the industry, they have been forced to change their  accounting practices from the British 
Accounting system and Plan Comptable General to OCAM and now OHADA all with the 
aim of legitimising their activities (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001). As Scott (1987: 498) 
argues, the reason why organisations change their accounting practices is not just for 
legitimacy, but because they might be rewarded with “resources and survival capabilities”. 
Unfortunately, such accounting rule changes within the MFI industry in Cameroon has led 
to different forms of accountability being practised across the industry (Unerman and 
O'Dwyer, 2006b). This has compromised the very existence of these institutions so much so 
that, they now behave as investors rather than helping the poor improve on their livelihood 
(Yunus, 2003).  What happens in essence is different and it is hard to find any MFI in 
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Cameroon that was registered as a category one microfinance operating within the strict 
limits of the category one institutions.  
As DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue, in order for managers and accountants 
to ease the pressure on them, they use their professional judgements to come up with 
practices that best suit their needs. One of such practices that managers use for their 
benefits is by requiring MFIs affiliated to their networks to pay huge fees. To a manager 
they “have to pay at least 50 per cent of what we make as profits per year to our umbrella 
organisation so as to remain in the business”. These fees according to a director at 
CamCCUL “is for the training we offer the mangers of the MFIs, to secure funding (if at 
all) from donors for these MFIs, train these MFIs on basic bookkeeping principles, 
supervision, control, correct their books in case of any control from the Ministry of Finance 
and COBAC, and charges for using our trade mark”.  
In our case, we realise that, MFIs managers use their professional judgements 
to manipulate the accounting and accountability system to their advantage. This is what 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983)refer to as normative isomorphism. According to Rodrigues 
and Craig (2007),  managers are able to use their influence which they have developed 
through their social interactions or formal education or through an elaborate professional 
network to diffuse their actions and practices across an organisation. In our case, these 
social actors have developed what we term a “manipulative accountability” practice that 
gives them the opportunity to focus on short-term outputs and efficiency criteria over long-
range goals concerning social development.  By doing so, they are able to create more 
wealth for their shareholders. The end result is, these shareholders fight to alleviate poverty 
among themselves in the very place before thinking of the poor who technically are 
supposed to be the sole beneficiaries of MFI services. 
 
The end of an affair - dribbling accountability? 
Due to the changes that the accounting system in Cameroon has undergone, 
thus leading to the harmonisation of accounting practices in Africa and CEMAC sub 
region, MFIs managers and accountants have used their professional judgements to 
organise themselves into two networks thereby influencing the ground rules that other 
institutions that enter the sector or the regulatory authorities have to follow (DiMaggio and 
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Powell, 1983).  As a result, these two networks control more than 75 per cent of deposits 
and 80 per cent of the market share in Cameroon
4
.  
With these MFIs having complete control of the sector, they are now only 
concerned with “return on their investment” as stated by a Director in the Ministry of 
Finance. When MFIs become concerned with their return on investments, Roberts (2013) 
argue that they trade off the social impact of microfinance for financial performance and 
thus push the wellbeing of the poor to the back burner. With MFIs now focusing on 
financial performance, to a consultant, this creates a “conflict of interest between the MFIs 
managers, accountants and clients” and leave managers in a dilemma. As a manager of an 
MFI argued, “we are actually caught in a conflict of interest between the regulatory 
authorities, our shareholders, our jobs and our clients. So at the end of the day, we have to 
make decisions if we want to survive and remain in business”. 
With MFIs facing issues with the governance structure within their 
organisations coupled with the fact that they now focus on financial performance, MFIs in 
Cameroon are required to pay corporation taxes. When a Director in the Ministry of 
Finance was asked why MFIs that have as mission social wellbeing of the poor has to pay 
corporate taxes, the Director argued that, “MFIs in Cameroon are now purely business 
entities and make profits more than classical banks in the country. So if a classical bank 
should pay corporate taxes on profits, it is but normal that MFIs pay taxes as well”.  
According to a consultant, the issue of corporate taxes for MFIs comes from the fact that 
“the poor clients have paid up to 120 per cent interest rate for an overdraft or loan whereas 
commercial banks charge between 25 and 40 percent on an overdraft”. According to Paul 
(2010), MFIs are suppose to charge higher interest rates than commercial banks because 
they incur higher operating costs in their activities. Rather than charging higher interest 
rates because of higher operating costs, a consultant argues that; 
“The whole process surrounding MFIs activities in Cameroon and the 
provisions of OHADA Accounting treaty has only led to a situation where 
these MFI managers, accountants and shareholders are there only to alleviate 
poverty amongst themselves first before thinking of the poor they are suppose 
to help”. 
                                                   
4 These statistics are based on information gathered during interviews 
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This therefore leaves MFIs operating in Cameroon to adopted different 
accountability mechanisms in order to meet up with the extra cost, thus alienating the poor 
who are supposed to be the sole beneficiaries of the microfinance services. Managers and 
accountants now use their professional judgements that they have developed through their 
social networks or through the professional education to go around the regulations and 
practice what we term “dribbling accountability”. Through this “dribbling accountability” 
practice, managers and accountants of MFIs sideline the regulations in place and opt for 
financial performance rather than go for the social wellbeing of the poor. 
 
Summary and conclusion 
The aim of this study was to identify the forms of accountability practices 
adopted by the MFIs in Cameroon and explore how such practices have evolved and 
become institutionalised through the time. The main research method used was case study 
with in-depth interviews with managers and accountants of two of the biggest microfinance 
networks in Cameroon, MFI clients and non clients, regulatory officials and accounting 
professionals. After analysing our data by applying the three elements of institutional 
theory (coercive, mimic and normative isomorphism), we have identified three forms of 
accountability practices consistent with MFIs operating within the two major networks in 
Cameroon; dysfunctional, manipulative, and dribbling accountabilities. As we have 
showed, the pressures for MFIs in Cameroon to be more accountable to their stakeholders 
has led to serious consequences of increase professionalism and larger bureaucratic 
structures thus resulting to MFIs practicing the different forms of accountabilities all with 
the aim of counteracting these pressures. 
As we have showed, the process of forcing MFIs in Cameroon to change their 
accounting and accountability systems has resulted to what we term “dysfunctional 
accountability” practice. The COBAC regulations have forced MFIs managers and 
accountants in Cameroon to strive at achieving homogeneity rather than efficiency. In 
doing so, this has given powers to the Reified Might to use such power over the Reified 
Right (Ebrahim, 2003) through creating a complex ownership structure in the form of 
investors. As a result, managers of these institutions with the aim of satisfying the needs of 
their employers, have instituted a system of oversight control mechanisms (Ahmed et al., 
2010) and given them the opportunity to practice whatever system of accountability they 
deem appropriate to help achieve the goals of satisfying their employers.  
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The process of making MFIs in Cameroon mime other successful MFIs in the 
sector, this has left MFI managers and accountants striving to satisfy their employers by 
manipulating the accounting system in place through what we term “manipulative 
accountability” practice. This form of accountability practice give these MFIs powers to 
focus on short-term outputs and efficiency criteria, which is generating enough dividends 
for their shareholders, over long-range goals concerning social development and change by 
concentrating their activities in urban areas with the aim of targeting rich investors so as to 
make huge profits for their shareholders.  
In order to manipulate the accounting system in place, managers and 
accountants use their professional judgements to practice what we term “dribbling 
accountability” practice. Through this form of accountability practice, MFI managers and 
accountants in Cameroon sideline the regulations in place to control licensing processes, 
create the ground rules that all other MFIs now have to follow, and practice two distinct 
methods of reaching the poor which gives them the possibility of legitimising their 
activities. Again since the MFI sector in Cameroon has turned into an lucrative investment 
sector, these regulations have created a conflict of interests between the MFI managers, 
accountants and shareholders on the one hand and MFI managers, accountants and clients 
on the other.  
Moreover, the MFI managers and accountants in order to preserve their jobs, 
strive at satisfying their shareholders, rather than taking interest in the poor. Consequently, 
MFIs in Cameroon have ceased being agents of change to the societies in which they are 
considered as agents of social change (Ebrahim, 2005). The end results is, the 
(dysfunctional, manipulative and dribbling) accountability practices practiced by MFIs in 
Cameroon is a curse for poverty alleviation since MFIs now use the powers given them as 
power of empowerment over the poor rather than power of empowerment of the poor 
(Jayasinghe and Wickramasinghe, 2011). The end result is, these shareholders fight to 
alleviate poverty among themselves in the very first place before thinking of the poor who 
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